In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that pictorial form cannot be depicted. First, I explain the ontology, the picture theory of meaning, and the show-say distinction in the Tractatus before interpreting Wittgenstein’s argument. As his conclusion may be interpreted in multiple ways, I argue for the formulation “a picture cannot depict any state of affairs involving its pictorial form.” I show that his argument is similar to that of David Hume against the idea of the self, considering one possible objection.

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In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke argues against the view that all necessary truths are a priori. Among the examples he gives to support his argument are necessary a posteriori truths and necessary truths that are not clearly a priori. His first example of the second type is Goldbach’s conjecture in mathematics. While all mathematical truths are commonly held to be necessary, those with unknown truth values are not obviously a priori. I will first discuss the distinctions between necessary/contingent and a priori/a posteriori. After I elaborate on Kripke’s argument, I will provide another mathematical example, the four colour theorem, that appears more convincingly not a priori. However, I will show that it is unknown that either example is truly necessary a posteriori.

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