In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein argues that pictorial form cannot be depicted. First, I explain the ontology, the picture theory of meaning, and the show-say distinction in the Tractatus before interpreting Wittgenstein’s argument. As his conclusion may be interpreted in multiple ways, I argue for the formulation “a picture cannot depict any state of affairs involving its pictorial form.” I show that his argument is similar to that of David Hume against the idea of the self, considering one possible objection.

Continue reading…

In Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke argues against the view that all necessary truths are a priori. Among the examples he gives to support his argument are necessary a posteriori truths and necessary truths that are not clearly a priori. His first example of the second type is Goldbach’s conjecture in mathematics. While all mathematical truths are commonly held to be necessary, those with unknown truth values are not obviously a priori. I will first discuss the distinctions between necessary/contingent and a priori/a posteriori. After I elaborate on Kripke’s argument, I will provide another mathematical example, the four colour theorem, that appears more convincingly not a priori. However, I will show that it is unknown that either example is truly necessary a posteriori.

Continue reading…

In Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, George Berkeley questions the common belief that there exist things independent of the mind. I will focus on his Master Argument. First, I will discuss the concepts of mind-independence, conceivability, and conception. These concepts are analyzed in a rather austere fashion in an attempt to pinpoint exactly what is being referred to. After this, a quick formulation of Berkeley’s Master Argument suffices for an understanding of it. Then, I will insert a temporal element into the argument, and use it to propose three types of possible counterexamples. It will be shown that while two of these types fail, one of them succeeds in refuting the Master Argument.

Continue reading…

Jaegwon Kim shows that antireductive physicalism cannot account for mental causation if we agree to two intuitive principles about causation, with the result that we must accept reductive physicalism in order to keep believing in mental causation. I shall defend this view. First, I will explain each concept used in the argument: reductive and antireductive physicalism, sufficient cause, mental causation, the causal closure principle, and the causal exclusion principle. My discussion on mental causation is especially long to give reasons for believing in it. Then, I will lay out Kim’s causal exclusion argument based on these concepts, giving reasons for the antireductive physicalist to agree with his assumptions and principles. The point is that the antireductive physicalist cannot refute them in a satisfactory manner, and so she must let go of at least one of the beliefs she should be inclined to keep.

Continue reading…

René Descartes’ proof of the existence of God in his Fifth Meditation rests on his knowledge that existence is in the essence of the idea of God. I will raise doubt on this proof by showing that his idea of God is incomplete. First, I will explain what he means by idea and essence so I can elaborate on his proof. Then, I will analyze his example of the essence of the idea of a triangle and give a counterexample to it. This counterexample shows that his idea of a triangle is incomplete and needs to be refined. By analogy, I will show that his idea of God is incomplete in a similar way and also needs to be refined.

Continue reading…

Killing is prohibited by the first of five Buddhist precepts.^[1] Thus, it may be surprising that Mahāyāna Buddhism allows killing in certain contexts. In fact, Mahāyāna Buddhism is a form of situational ethics with an emphasis on virtue, as in Aristotle’s virtue ethics. To support this thesis, the qualities of Mahāyāna Buddhism and the role of the bodhisattva must first be examined, especially the concepts of compassion (karunā) and skilful means (upāya-kauśalya). Next, the utilitarian characteristics of skilful means will be questioned, followed by a comparison with situational ethics. This will be used to show that Mahāyāna ethics manages to combine situational ethics with the seemingly contrasting theory of virtue ethics. Finally, bodhisattva vows are considered as to whether they are necessary or obligatory in the sense of Kantian duty.

Continue reading…